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Abstract—A first multi-proxy multi-signcryption scheme from pairings,
which efficiently combines a multi-proxy multi-signature scheme with a
signcryption, is proposed. Its security is analyzed in detail. In our scheme,
a proxy signcrypter group could be authorized as a proxy agent by the
cooperation of all members in the original signcrypter group. Then the
proxy signcryptions can be generated by the cooperation of all the
signcrypters in the authorized proxy signcrypter group on behalf of the
original signcrypter group. The correctness and the security of this
scheme are proved.
Index Terms—Bilinear pairing, Computational Diffie-Hellman
Problem, Discrete Logarithm Problem, Multi-Proxy Multi-Signcryption,
signature
 I. INTRODUCTION
In 1996, Mambo et al [1] first introduced the concept of a proxy
signature scheme, which allows the original signer to delegate his
signature power to a designed signer, called the proxy signer. Then
the proxy signer is able to sign on behalf of the original signer. Since
the proxy signature scheme was brought forward, lots of schemes
have been proposed [2-8]. In 2002, Hwang et al [3] first proposed the
concept of multi-proxy multi-signature. In a multi-proxy multi-
signature scheme, only the cooperation of all members in the original
signer group could authorize a proxy group as his proxy agent. Then
only the cooperation of all the signers in the authorized proxy group
can generate the proxy signatures on behalf of the original signer
group.
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Signcryption is a public key primitive proposed by Zheng [9] to
achieve the combined functionality of digital signature schemes and
encryption in an efficient manner. LI et al [10] have proposed a proxy
signcryption which efficiently combines a proxy signature scheme
with a signcryption. However, none of the existing signcryption
schemes is multi-proxy multi-signcryption scheme. In this paper,
based on the Xue et al Scheme [8], we propose a multi-proxy multi-
signcryption scheme from pairings. In a multi-proxy multi-
signcryption scheme, only the cooperation of all members in the
original signcrypter group could authorize a proxy group as his proxy
agent. Then only the cooperation of all the signcrypters in the
authorized proxy group can generate the proxy signcryptions on
behalf of the original signcrypter group. We analyze the proposed
scheme from correctness and security points of view. We show that
the proposed scheme provide all the security properties required by
multi-proxy multi-signcryption.
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we define the
notation of the bilinear pairing as preliminary. In Section 3, we
propose our scheme. In Section 4, we discuss our scheme in terms of
security. Finally, we conclude our paper in Section 5.
 II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we will briefly describe the basic definition and
properties of the bilinear pairings and some problems. Let 1G  be a
cyclic additive group generated by P, whose order is a prime q, and
2G  be a cyclic multiplicative group of the same order q. )(⋅H
denotes a cryptography hash function and Mx R∈  means x is
selected randomly in M. A bilinear pairings is a map
211:ˆ GGGe →×  with the following properties:
1. Bilinear: For all 1,, GRQP ∈ and *, qZba ∈ , such that
),(ˆ),(ˆ),(ˆ RPeQPeRQPe =+
),(ˆ),(ˆ),(ˆ RQeRPeRQPe =+
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2abQPeabQPeQabPebQaPe ),(ˆ),(ˆ),(ˆ),(ˆ ===
2. Non-degenerate: There exists 1GP ∈ , such that 1),(ˆ ≠PPe .
3. Computable: Given 1, GQP ∈ , there is an efficient algorithm to
compute ),(ˆ QPe .
Now we describe some mathematical problems in relation to
bilinear pairs.
●Discrete Logarithm Problem ( DLP ): Given two group elements
P  and Q , find an integer n , such that nPQ =  whenever such an
integer exists.
●Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem ( DDHP ): For *,, qR Zcba ∈ ,
1GP ∈ , given cPbPaPP ,,, , decide whether qabc mod= .
● Computational Diffie-Hellman Problem ( CDHP ): For
*, qR Zba ∈ , 1GP ∈ , given bPaPP ,, , compute abP .
●Gap Diffie-Hellman Problem ( GDHP ): On the group 1G ,
DDHP  is easy but CDHP  is hard. Now we call 1G  a Gap Diffie-
Hellman ( GDH ) group.
We assume through this paper that CDHP  and DLP  are
intractable in 1G  and 2G . GDH  groups can be found on
supersingular elliptic curves or hyperelliptic curves over finite field,
and the bilinear parings can be derived from the Weil or Tate pairing.
Our scheme is based on GDH  group.
Basically, a secure multi-proxy multi-signcryption scheme should
satisfy the following requirements: Strong unforgeability,
Verifiability, Strong identifiability, Strong undeniability, Prevention
of misuse, and Confidentiality.
 III. PROPOSED SCHEME
This section proposes a pairing-based multi-proxy multi-
signcryption scheme. Our multi-proxy multi-signcryption scheme is
divided into four phases: System initialization phase, Proxy key
generation phase, multi-proxy multi-signcryption generation phase,
and Unsigncryption phase.
System Initialization: Let nAA ""1  be n  original signcrypters.
For ni ≤∀≤1 , iA  has a private key aix  and corresponding public
key aiy , such that 
*
qRai Zx ∈  and Pxy aiai = . Let the proxy group
consist of l  proxy signcrypters. The proxy
signcrypter ),,2,1( ljPj …=  owns its private key pjx and its public
key pjy , such that 
*
qRpj Zx ∈  and Pxy pjpj = . The original
signcrypters ),,2,1( niAi …=  jointly ask the proxy signcrypter group
),,2,1( ljPj …=  to carry out signcrypting a document m  for them
altogether. Let C  be the unsigncrypter. C  has a secret key cx  and
corresponding public cy , such that 
*
qRc Zx ∈  and Pxy cc = . Let E
and D be the encryption and the decryption functions, respectively,
defined by an available symmetric algorithm, and be previously
known to the signcrypter, the proxy signcrypter and the unsigncrypter.
Let public collision resistant hash function )(1 ⋅H , )(2 ⋅H  and
)(3 ⋅H  be **1 }1,0{: qZH → , 1*2 }1,0{: GH → , nGH }1,0{: 23 →
respectively. Finally the system parameters are
),,,,,,,ˆ,,( 32121 DEHHHqPeGG .
Proxy Key Generation: To delegate the signcrypting capability to a
group of proxy signcrypters, the original signcrypters do the
following to make the signed warrant wm . In wm , there is an
explicit description of the delegation relation including the identity of
the original signcrypters and the proxy signcrypters, the message to
be signed, and so on. If the following process is finished successfully,
each proxy signcrypter ),,2,1( ljPj …=  gets a proxy key
),,2,1( ljS pj …= .
1. Each original signcrypter computes )(2 waiai mHxS =  and
broadcasts his aiS  to the l  proxy signcrypter. In addition, the first
original signcrypter broadcasts wm  to the l  proxy signcrypter, for
3ni ,,2,1 …= .
2. The proxy signcrypter group verifies the correctness of aiS  by
an equation
))(,(ˆ),(ˆ 2 waiai mHyeSPe =            (1)
for ni ,,2,1 …= .
3. Once all of the above Eq. (1) hold, the proxy signcrypter group
computes ∑ == ni aiA SS 1 . Each member of the proxy signcrypter
group jP  computes his proxy signcryption key
)(2 wpjApj mHxSS +=              (2)
for lj ,,2,1 …= .
Multi-Proxy Multi-Signcryption Generation: To generate a multi-
proxy multi-signcryption on a message m  that conforms to the
warrant wm , one proxy signcrypter in the proxy signcryption group
is designated as a clerk, whose task is to combine partial proxy
signcryption to generate the final multi-proxy multi-signcryption.
1. Each proxy signcrypter jP  selects an integer 
*
qRj Zt ∈ , for
lj ,,2,1 …= .
2. Each proxy signcrypter jP  computes 
jt
cpj yPer ),(ˆ=  and
broadcasts pjr  to the other 1−l  proxy signcrypters, for
lj ,,2,1 …= .
3. Each proxy signcrypter jP  computes )( 13 pj
l
j rHk =∏= ,
)(mEc k= , )||(1 kcHrp = , pjpjpj SrPtu −= , and sends pju  to the
clerk as his partial proxy signcryption on m , for lj ,,2,1 …= .
4. The clerk computes ∑ == lj pjp uu 1 , AlSS = , and sends
),,,,( ppw urcSm  to the unsigncrypter.
Unsigncryption: After receiving the multi-proxy multi-
signcryption ),,,,( ppw urcSm , C  computes
))),((ˆ),(ˆ),(ˆ(
123
cpp xrl
j pjw
r
ccp ymHeySeyueHk ∑ ==      (3)
)(cDm k=                        (4)
and accepts the multi-proxy multi-signcryption if and only if
)||(1 kcHrp = .
 IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
 Verifiability: The consistency of this scheme can be verified as
follows:
)( 13 pj
l
j rHk =∏=
)),(ˆ( 13
jt
c
l
j yPeH =∏=
)),)((ˆ(
13 c
l
j pjppj ySrueH ∑ = +=
)),))(((ˆ),(ˆ(
1 23
pr
c
l
j wpjAcp ymHxSeyueH ∑ = +=
))),((ˆ),(ˆ),(ˆ(
123
cpp xrl
j pjw
r
ccp ymHeySeyueH ∑ ==         (5)
In the unsigncryption phase, C  can recover the value of k , thus
the signcryption can be unsigncrypt.
Strong Unforgeability: As for multi-proxy multi-signcryption,
there are mainly four kinds of attackers: any third party, who do not
participate the issue of the multi-proxy multi-signcryption; some
proxy signcrypter, who play an active in the signcrypting process; the
original signcrypter and the signcryption owner. Because the multi-
proxy multi-signcryption ∑ == lj pjp uu 1 contains secret key
information pjx  of each proxy signcrypter jP  in the proxy multi-
signcryption key generation phase, without secret key information
pjx  of jP , any third party, some proxy signcrypter, the signcryption
owner and the original signcrypters cannot generate a valid multi-
proxy multi-signcryption scheme by themselves.
Strong Identifiability: The unsigncrypter can distinguish proxy's
normal signcryption from his multi-proxy multi-signcryption,
because the multi-proxy multi-signcryption key is different from his
own private key.
Strong Nonrepudiation: In our scheme, each proxy signcrypter
4jP  cannot repudiate his participation on multi-proxy multi-
signcryption while illegal attacker cannot claim that he is proxy
signcrypter, because ∑ == lj pjp uu 1  contains secret key information
pjx of each proxy signcrypter jP , at the same time, warrant wm
also contains identity information of jP , In addition
))),((ˆ),(ˆ),(ˆ(
123
cpp xrl
j pjw
r
ccp ymHeySeyueHk ∑ ==  contains pjy  and
wm .
Confidentiality: Because the secret key k contains secret key
information cx  of C , only C  can compute k  and recover m.
Prevention of Misuse: Each proxy signcrypter jP  cannot
repudiate his participation on multi-proxy multi-signcryption, in
addition, wm  includs the message to be signed, so our scheme can
prevent the misuse.
 V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, based on the Xue et al Scheme [8], we construct a
new multi-proxy multi-signcryption scheme from pairings (To the
best of our knowledge, there is not any multi-proxy multi-
signcryption scheme published in the open literature.) and analyze its
security in detail. We prove that this scheme is correct and secure.
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